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The Kuomintang-Commrinist 
Crisis in China 
By Anna Louise Strong 
I T is no service to China either to mini-mize or exaggerate the present tension between the Communist Party and the 
Kuomintang. The threat of widespread civil 
war is serious but the situation is not yet 
fatal. It has reached the stage in which the 
actions of "friendly nations" may either ruin 
or save the situation-in which, for example, 
the actions of those in charge of American 
foreign loans may prove decisive. But they 
must first know-what Chungking censorship 
conceals-that there is a situation to be 
saved. 
The January armed clash in South An-
hwei in which some 2,000 of the Communist-
led New Fourth Army were killed and be-
tween 3,000 and 4,000 wounded, after which 
the army itself was officially disbanded and 
its general, Yeh Ting, held for court-martial, 
was only the latest of many armed clashes 
between Communist and Kuomintang troops 
which have gone on for more than a year. 
Nor is even this particular incident settled, 
as Chungking officially claimed. On the con-
trary, it has led to far more threatening de-
velopments. The Communists have not ac-
cepted the disbanding of the New Fourth, 
but have organized their own "Revolution-
ary Military . Committee" which appointed 
new commanders for the 90,000 men which 
still function under the name of the New 
Fourth north of the Yangtze. 
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An official "spokesman" for this committee 
immediately issued an interview in response 
to the January 17th announcement of the 
Chungking Military Council disbanding the 
New Fourth. He charged that the attack on 
the New Fourth was only one step in the 
plot of the "pro-Japanese elements who oc-
cupy high positions in the government and 
the Kuomintang" to bring about a peace 
pact with Japan and to have China join the 
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Nowhere in his 
statement does the spokesman denounce 
Chiang Kai-shek himself. He attacks by 
name Ho Ying-chin, Chungking's Minister 
of War, who has been for some time charged 
with being the present center of the pro-
Japanese forces which formerly grouped 
around the now puppet-ruler of Nanking, 
Wang Ching-wei. 
On the basis of these extremely serious 
charges, the Communist Military Committee 
issued what practically amounts to an ulti-
matum in twelve points. The demands are of 
such a drastic nature that they must be con-
sidered as an attempt to break through to 
the Generalissimo's attention by dynamite. 
They include the "cessation of attacks on 
Communist armies,'' the revoking of the or-
der disbanding the New Fourth, the freeing 
of its general, Yeh Ting, an open apology 
by the government for the "South Anhwei 
outrage" and compensation paid to its vic-
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tims, the abolition of a blockade line now 
maintained in the northwest again t the 
Yenan district, the "punishment" of Ho 
Ying-chin and several subordinates, and the 
arrest and court-martial of the "pro-Japa-
nese elements" in Chungking. Both the 
charges and demands were made immediate-
ly following Chungking's January 17th pro-
nouncement, but the news of them was sup-
pressed by Chungking censorship, and 
reached America a month late. 
International Setting 
The present situation must be seen against 
the background of Japanese plus German 
intrigue working upon all the backward and 
reactionary elements in China, and exploiting 
the never completely settled cleavage of the 
earlier civil war. The international setting 
of the present period begins with the Tripar-
tite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, 
and with the arrival of many new German 
advisers in Tokyo. These events served to 
stimulate Japan's desire to settle the "China 
incident" as rapidly as possible in order to 
move south against the French, British and 
Dutch possessions, which she is powerless to 
do with a united and hostile China in her 
rear. 
Early last autumn, Japan began to spread 
peace rumors in China. More or less definite 
peace proposals reached Chungking through 
Chinese bankers in Hongkong and even 
through semi-official spokesmen over the 
Tokyo radio. It was intimated that China 
need only: ( 1) recognize Manchoukuo, 
(2) recognize Japan's special interests in 
North China, (3) leave China's ports in 
Japanese hands, and ( 4) cooperate with the 
"New Order in East Asia," which meant al-
most anything up to a complete economic, 
political and military alliance with Japan. 
In return for this, Japan would withdraw her 
troops from Central and South China-
which Japan most devoutly longs to do. 
Chiang Kai-shek, however, strengthened by 
the British and American loans, refused to 
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talk peace. It was then that Japan finally, and 
without much enthusiasm, recognized the 
Nanking regime of Wang Ching-wei. 
No pro-Japanese or pro-peace groups 
would dare express themselves openly in 
Chungking. Behind the scenes, however, there 
are capitulators who express themselves either 
by defeatism or by stirring up internal fric-
tion, or by actual plotting with the enemy. 
As a· high Chungking official, who was not a 
Communist, said to me: "Wang Ching-wei 
is gone but his secret supporters remain and 
are at the root of the trouble." The power of 
these capi~ulators would be greatly increased 
if any of the following developments occur-
red : ( 1 ) if Japan made a big concession, 
such as withdrawal from the Yangtze valley; 
( 2) if Britain and America ceased to sup-
port China's struggle for freedom and de-
mocratic progress; ( 3) if hoarding, specula-
tion and profiteering continue to demoralize 
internal economic conditions in Free China; 
or ( 4) if there were an increase in civil strife. 
In a military sense, the Sino-Japanese war 
has been for some time at the stage of stale-
mate, in which Japan's chief weapons have 
become economic pressure and political in-
trigue. In using political intrigue Japan 
merely continues to wield a weapon which 
she used successfully in China for the entire 
generation preceding the present war. Co-
operation with Japan only recently seemed to 
northern provincial governors and even to 
many Nanking politicians a respectable path 
to riches and power. 
The first serious check to Japan's policy of 
"divide and conquer" came when the ten 
years of civil strife between Chiang Kai-shek 
and the Communists was called off in favor of 
resistance against the common national foe. 
This was a program around which all China 
rallied; even backward, provincial warlords 
were compelled to submit to the Chinese 
people's will for unity against Japan. Gen-
eral Han Fu-chu, Governor of Shantung, was 
executed for the kind of dealing with the 
enemy which was political wisdom a year 
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earlier. But it would be utopian to assume 
that all the former traffickers with Japan 
were at once converted. There is still a 
strong tendency among China's reactionary 
militarists to regard Japan as the natural 
military organizer of East Asia. Moreover, 
Japan's fifth column work has been greatly 
strengthened by her pact with Germany, for 
Germany, having given considerable help to 
the Chungking government in the early 
stages of the war, still has many friends in 
high places in China. 
The Hankow Period 
The high point of Chinese national unity 
was reached during the "Hankow period," 
from the fall of Nanking in 1937 to the fall 
of Hankow in late 1938. Nanking's fall had 
broken the exclusive hold of the Shanghai 
capitalists over the government. Chiang Kai-
shek had announced that the vast peasant 
populations of the interior were China's new 
base. Hankow was an ideal capital, more 
easily accessible to all parts of the interior 
than either Peiping, Nanking or Chungking. 
Hankow had peasant revolutionary traditions 
of nearly a century, dating back to the days 
of the Taipings. It had a larger industrial 
working class than any Chinese city except 
Shanghai. From the Inilitary standpoint, the 
heroic but bloody defense of Shanghai had 
shown China's weakness in traditional me-
thods of war, but the sudden emergence of 
the Communist-led guerrillas in North China 
was giving new hope to the nation. All of 
these factors helped to create a new sense of 
national unity around Hankow as a center, a 
unity in which the Communists played an 
important part. 
The unity attained in the Hankow period, 
however, was never reduced to organized 
form. Despite much talk of democracy and 
much energetic popular initiative, the Kuo-
mi.ntang Party never recognized as legal any 
popular organizations except those which 
they themselves initiated and controlled. The 
Cmnmunist Border District with its capital 
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at Yenan was never 1 ally recognized. It 
was never clearly deterinined whether the 
Communist Party was legal or illegal. It 
depended on the will of the local generals, 
most of whom suppressed Communists. The 
~upposed amnesty of 1937 was only partly 
carried out; two Americans traveling in 1940 
in South Kiangsi found 60 forgotten Com-
munist prisoners in a single prison, held since 
1934. (They are still there.) In Hankow it-
self there were assassinations of Communists 
and raids on their newspaper by gangsters 
alleged to have ties with the secret police of 
the Kuomintang. When these matters 
reached the attention of the Generalissimo, 
however, he usually demanded that the ag-
gressors live up to the new unity that had 
been proclaimed. 
No governmental machinery had been 
established through which unity Inight be ex-
pressed and questions settled. The "National 
Congress" consisted of Kuomintang mem-
bers elected four years previously during 
the period of civil war; and some of its 
members were and still are in Japanese pup-
pet governments. A constitution making the 
Kuomintang the only legal party had been 
drawn up, but due to the Japanese invasion 
the Congress had not met to adopt it. Begin-
ning in Hankow, the democratic forces de-
manded a new National Congress based on 
popular elections, but the government Ininis-
ters who had been appointed by the previ-
ous Congress and who would be inevitably 
unseated by any new Congress, claimed that 
elections could not be held during the war. 
The deadlock in which the old Congress 
could not be summoned and a new one could 
not be elected was partly broken by a new 
body, "The People's Political Council," 
formed during the Hankow period in 
response to popular demand. It has 220 
members representing practically all the dif-
ferent political groups in China, but its 
powers are advisory only and its membership 
is handpicked by the Kuoinintang which 
decides even who shall represent the Com-
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munist Party. The members of the People's 
Political Council whom I met in Chung-
king seemed to be able and devoted intel-
lectuals greatly disturbed by the growing dis-
unity in China, but powerless to prevent it. 
They complained that they had formed a 
committee almost a year ago to investigate 
the Kuomintang-Communist friction but the 
Chungking government paid no attention. to 
their report. 
Chiang Kai-shek's power obviously does 
not rest upon such ineffective forms of gov-
ernment. It rests upon his armies and his 
moral prestige as the symbol of China's 
unity. He has no constitutional power to re-
organize the government. He is neither the 
president of a democracy nor a fascist dicta-
tor; his status is more like that of the ear!y 
kings who emerged from feudalism through 
the allegiance of many rival lords. If he 
greatly desired, he might get rid of any in-
dividual minister in the government or any 
individual general in the army, but only by 
political combinations and pressures which 
might sap his power in another direction. 
He has no conception of what is meant by 
"rule of the people"; he once said, "If the 
people rule, then how can I rule?" More-
over, to make changes in a democratic direc-
tion became harder rather than easier with 
the lapse of time. For by the time the gov-
ernment moved to Chungking, it was so 
widely accepted as the "Central Government 
of China" in a sense which no government 
had ever been before, that even those bank-
ers of the coast who were ready to make 
terms with Japan felt the authority of 
Chungking and returned to it. They resumed 
their wonted sway which the fall of Nanking 
had temporarily broken. Even the talk of 
democracy, which had been so vivid during 
the days in Hankow, died. When I visited 
Chungking in December, 1940, no public 
meetings were allowed without a representa-
tive of the police, empowered to interrupt the 
speech at any moment. 
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CHIN A 
General Ho Ying-chin 
Ministers who had seemed slated for im-
mediate dismi~sal during the Hankow period 
not only remained but increased their power. 
The most notorious case was that of Gen-
eral Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, by 
whom all commands to the armies are issued. 
For the past decade he has been famous for 
two things: his wars with the Communists 
and his agreements with Japan. The 1935 
Ho-Umetsu agreement, for instance, gave 
Japan such dominance of North China that 
it became the cause of student demonstra-
tions against "Japan and Ho Ying-chin." 
Its ter~could never be published in China 
proper lest they cause the fall of the Nan-
king government. General Ho was known to 
be opposed to the present war with Japan. 
Today he signs all the orders that carry it 
on. All orders to Communist armies and all 
complaints from Communist armies to the 
Generalissimo pass through his hands. 
When I expressed in Chungking my 
amazement that a man with this past should 
be kept by the Generalissimo in such an im-
portant post, I was told: "Oh, but the Gen-
eralissimo could hardly do without him and 
it is not even certain that he could depose 
him. General Ho has much closer relations 
with all the lower generals than has the Gen-
eralissimo himself." One need not elaborate 
on the chances for intrigue which this 
creates. Ho Ying-chin has used the new 
Chinese unity, which he did his best to pre-
vent, as the slogan under which he transfer-
red troops and officers, breaking all rivals 
and building his own military machine. He 
has thus placed himself in a position to be 
Japan's most valuable ally in the military 
domination of East Asia. 
New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies 
Far away from Chungking in the north 
and east of China, separated from "Free 
China" by Japanese concentrations and 
Chinese armed forces alike, the Communist-
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led armies rapidly increased. They were as-
signed only territory which the Japanese had 
already conquered, the Eighth Route in 
North China and the New Fourth on the 
Lower Yangtze. They were allotted pay for 
45,000 soldiers in the Eighth Route and a 
much smaller number in the New Fourth. 
They were, however, allowed to organize 
peasant guerrillas and on this basis they 
grew rapidly, until by the end of 1940 they 
claimed from 500,000 to 600,000 armed but 
unpaid men. They campaigned all over Japa-
nese-occupied China, from Manchuria to the 
Yangtze, from the Mongolian deserts to the 
sea. They penetrated Manchuria to within a 
hundred miles of Mukden, and established 
contact with 100,000 poorly organized Man-
churian Volunteers. They reached the Shan-
tung coast and held the port of Chefoo long 
enough to collect customs revenue and run 
in several shiploads of war supplies from 
Shanghai and Tientsin. They disrupted 
Japanese rail communications on all sides of 
Peiping and put up proclamations inside the 
city walls. Extending southward the Eighth 
Route eventually made contact with the 
New Fourth Army, which in its turn was ex-
panding along the entire Yangtze Valley 
from the area north of Shanghai to districts 
almost as far inland as Hankow. 
This "unruly expansion" was the chief 
thing held against the Communist armies by 
Chungking officials with whom I talked in 
December 1940. Both Sun Fo and Pai 
Chung-hsi told me that if the Communists 
would remain in the areas assigned them, 
organize only the authorized number of 
troops and obey the local magistrates ap-
pointed by Chungking, there would be no 
trouble. But the Communists were faced with 
ever-increasing bands of hungry, armed 
peasants who demanded to be taken into 
their armies, and who otherwise would de-
generate into local bandits or Japanese pup-
pet troops. Their attempts to give these 
peasants leadership and organization against 
Japan were handicapped by lack of funds and 
food. Since Chungking refused support for 
such numbers, they tried to form local gov-
ernments whose taxing-power could regular-
ize the food levies on the countryside. In this 
they were opposed by local magistrates ap-
pointed by distant Chungking, who had no 
interest in giving them food. "When we got 
customs revenue from Chefoo," said a young 
woman with the Eighth Route Army, "the 
Shantung governor expected us to give it to 
him. He lost Chefoo to the Japanese and we 
got it; we needed the food for ourselves." 
This was the origin of one local clash .... All 
such clashes took place far behind Japanese 
lines, and news of them reached Chungking 
through channels provided by Ho Ying-chin. 
Under such conditions local clashes grew 
more frequent and widespread, with increas-
ing participation by the authorities in 
Chungking. The first serious armed clash oc-
curred late in 1939 in North Shensi. The 
Special Border District, with its capital at 
Yenan, had declared allegiance to the 
Chungking Government, but the Central 
Government had given no legal status nor 
fixed boundaries to the district. General Hu 
Tsung-nan, Governor of Shensi, decided 
that the district was his and sent armies 
to occupy it ; generals in Kansu collabo-
rated. After Yenan had lost four of the 
twenty-three hsien which it claimed, part of 
Ho Lung's men-Eighth Route forces opera-
ting JUSt across the Yell ow River-came back 
to Yenan as home defense. Yenan lost no 
more hsien but three concentric lines of 
block-houses began to be built in narrowing 
circles against the Border District-the tactics 
which squeezed the Communists out of South 
China in the earlier civil war. By the end of 
1940 two thousand such block houses had 
been built. 
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The next important clash occurred in the 
adjacent province of Shansi between the Old 
and New Armies of Yen Hsi-shan. Yen's 
original army broke very badly in 1937 under 
the first J apanese onslaught which they had 
never been equipped to withstand. Yen re-
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organized them, adding local peasant boys. 
Much of this enrollment was taking place 
during my visit to Shansi in 1938. Thous-
ands of Shansi boys were applying to join 
the Eighth Route because of its superior 
prestige, but they were being told: "We 
have no money for soldiers; join Yen Hsi-
shan." Yen's new army was therefore strong-
ly pro-Eighth Route and followed its tactics 
in organizing the local peasants. Conflicting 
accounts exist of the clash that finally de-
veloped between the two different armies of 
General Yen. Chungking claims that it was 
inspired by the Eighth Route; Communists 
state that, on the contrary, it broke out in 
spite of them, and that, after it occurred, 
they "mediated" and induced the New 
Army to withdraw to Northwest Shansi. In 
any event, the New Army now operates in 
close conjunction with the Eighth Route in 
that territory, where to some extent it re-
places the forces that returned to Yenan. 
Throughout 1940 an armed blockade se-
parated all Eighth Route and New Fourth 
territory from "Free China." An estimated 
one-fifth of Chungking's total forces were 
diverted to "watching" the Communists. 
Students trying to go to Yenan for education 
were detained in Sian; if they persisted in 
their dangerous desire they were thrown 
into concentration camps. For fourteen 
months the Eighth Route claimed to have 
received no munitions or medical supplies 
from the Central Government; if any were 
sent, they failed to get through. Truckloads 
of medical supplies sent by Madame Sun 
Yat-sen's organization, the China Defense 
League, were indefinitely detained. Even a 
foreign doctor who tried to reach Wutaishan 
to replace Dr. Norman Bethune was unable 
to pass and finally accepted medical service 
among Central Government troops. One oc-
casion at least is recorded when armed men 
taking the payroll for the New Fourth Army 
were seized by other Chinese troops of the 
Central Government; neither the payroll nor 
the soldiers were ever released. Only oc-
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casionally could this unofficial blockade be 
penetrated by men with high prestige. 
Clashes between Communist-led armies 
and other Central Government forces became 
epidemic in the summer of 1940. They took 
place in Hopei, Shantung, North Kiangsu, 
East Anhwei, South Anhwei and at the 
northern edge of Chekiang. Details are im-
possible to verify, since each side charges 
the other with attacking, and though the 
Communists asked for an investigation com-
mission, none was sent. Meanwhile the high 
staffs in the Kuomintang-led armies made 
speeches to their subordinates urging that 
they must be prepared to fight the Commu-
nists. Pamphlets were published denouncing 
the Communists as the most dangerous ele-
ment in the nation; in Hongkong I was told 
that 200,000 such pamphlets had been sent 
out to Overseas Chinese. Deadly phrases 
were whispered: "Japanese are only lice on 
the body of China but Communism is a 
disease of the heart." The repression spread 
beyond the Communists to all united front 
organizations; the famous "Life" bookshops 
of the National Salvation Movement were 
closed in ten cities. Many organizers of the 
Industrial Cooperatives were arrested, 
kidnaped and even assassinated as "Reds,'' 
a term which might merely cover the 
jealousy of a local official who failed to get 
his squeeze from the cooperatives. 
Ho Ying-chin Cooperates with the Japanese 
There seems reason to think, in at least 
three cases, that local generals, acting under 
Ho Ying-chin's orders to check the Commu-
nists, were simultaneously cooperating with 
the Japanese. General Shih Yu-shan, who 
clashed with the Eighth Route in South 
Hopei, was a man of a picturesquely ad-
venturous past. He began his career as a 
commander under Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang 
and was left at loose ends when Feng was 
defeated by Chiang Kai-shek. When the 
present war with Japan began, Shih des-
paired of getting funds from Chiang Kai-
I 
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shek so he went over openly to Japan. After 
receiving money and munitions for his needy 
troops, he declared loyalty to Chungking and 
gained much face for thus outwitting the 
Japanese. He expected to be made Governor 
of Hopei and was disgruntled when denied 
the post. He was, however, assigned the ter-
ritory of South Hopei and is alleged to have 
had orders from Ho Ying-chin to check the 
Eighth Route's expansion by cutting the 
connections between their Shansi and Cen-
tral Hopei forces. 
Charges that General Shih was conspiring 
with the Japanese were sent to Chiang Kai-
shek on July 2 in an official telegram by Chu 
Teh, commander-in-chief of the Eighth 
Route. He stated that on June 22, General 
Shih sent instructions to all his subordinates 
giving a code of signals, consisting of white 
sheets placed on the ground, by which Japa-
nese planes could distinguish his troops from 
those of the Eighth Route. This informa-
tion, plus other details of Shih's collaboration 
with the Japanese, had been given to Chu 
Teh by Shih's subordinates who did not wish 
to side with Japan. No answer was received 
from Chungking to this accusation, but later 
in July Shih's forces, in coordination with 
Japanese puppet troops and with the aid of 
Japanese planes, attacked the Eighth Route 
near Puyang and Poshan. Shih was shot by 
one of his own brigade commanders and most 
of his troops came over to the Eighth Route. 
For several months no details of this conflict 
reached Chungking, and details arc still con-
flicting. But by the end of November it he-
came known that General Shih was dead. 
Then General Wei Li-huang, commander of 
the war zone in which the incident occurred, 
announced that he had executed Shih for 
treason,-thus removing the onus of mutiny 
from his subordinates. The Central News 
Agency in Chungking, however, announced 
that Shih had been executed "for expanding 
his territory in defiance of orders." 
Similar charges of treason were made 
against General Miao Chen-liu, commander 
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of the 57th Army in South Shantung. Chu 
Teh sent a telegram to the Generalissimo in 
July, giving an exhaustive list of Miao's al-
leged dealings with the Japanese, as revealed 
to Chu Teh by Miao's subordinates. These 
included the exchange of signals, exchange 
of emissaries, joint banquets-in fact, a fully 
worked out system of combined attack 
against the Eighth Route. No answer came 
from Chiang Kai-shek but Ho Ying-chin 
telegraphed back: "Don't slander your fel-
low-generals." Telegrams from division com-
manders under General Miao next went to 
Chungking revealing more conferences with 
the Japanese and appealing over the head 
of their commander to the Generalissimo. On 
October 9th, the entire staff of the 57th Army 
signed a joint telegram to Chiang Kai-shek 
declaring their general a traitor and de-
manding his execution. None of these tele-
grams was answered, but word was spread in 
Chungking that "the Eighth Route is stir-
ring up trouble in other Chinese armies." 
Finally Miao's staff arrested him and sent 
him under guard to the commander-in-chief 
of the war zone who forwarded him to 
Chungking, where he is now busily circula-
ting his version of the affair. Meanwhile his 
troops, like those of General Shih's, have 
augmented the forces of the Eighth Route-
an indication of what may happen if civil 
war begins. 
Then there was the case of Admiral Shen 
Hung-lieh, Governor of Shantung. On 
August 5 Chu Teh wired the Generalissimo 
the details of how Shen's troops in coordina-
tion with the Japanese had attacked the 
115th Division of Lin Piao. On September 14 
Chu Teh again wired the Generalissimo 
other details. On September 24 the Kuomin-
tang Provincial Committee of Shantung 
wired the Kuomintang Executive in Chung-
king reporting Shen's liaison with the Japa-
nese. All these accusations and protests were 
disregarded. 
"We interpret these incidents," said a re-
presentative of the Eighth Route to me, "as 
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meaning that General Ho Ying-chin is ready 
to cooperate even with Japanese against the 
Communists." 
To my query whether Chiang Kai-shek 
had the same attitude as Ho Ying-chin, he 
replied: "We do not even know whether the 
Generalissimo gets all of our telegrams. We 
believe that Chiang does not at present want 
to make an agreement with Japan. He wishes 
to suppress the Communists more and more 
but not quite to the point of civil war and 
not quite to the point of interfering with 
the war against Japan. It is a very narrow 
road. Until now he has been able to take it. 
But he cannot take it long." 
Military History of the New Fourth Army 
The Generalissimo, however, has chosen 
to have a show-down and as a first step ac-
cepted personal responsibility for disbanding 
the New Fourth Army in the Yangtze Valley. 
This army consisted officially of four "units," 
functioning as independent groups in dif-
ferent areas on both sides of the Lower 
Yangtze, assigned to them originally by 
Chiang Kai-shek. After the fall of Hankow 
the New Fourth was augmented by 20,000 
dispersed soldiers from Central Honan who 
formed a fifth unit, and by large numbers of 
peasants on the borders of Hupeh, Honan 
and Anhwei who formed a sixth detachment. 
Later a battalion known as the Shangnan 
Volunteers, organized south of the Yangtze, 
grew so large that the commander of the 
war zone objected to it, and it crossed the 
Yangtze to avoid trouble and took its sta-
tion north of Shanghai and north of the 
river. 
Thus the New Fourth operated on both 
sides of the Yangtze almost from Shanghai 
to Hankow, in small detachments separated 
by some of the heaviest Japanese concentra-
tions in China. For three years its units were 
in constant contact with the Japanese, at-
tacking the Nanking-Shanghai railway, the 
Wuhu-Nanking railway, and the highways 
between Nanking and Hangchow. They 
wrecked trains, waylaid Japanese army 
trucks, stopped trade with the Japanese-held 
cities. In the autumn of 1938 they raided the 
Japanese-occupied airdrome within sight of 
Shanghai and hoisted the Chinese flag above 
its buildings. In the first year, the detach-
ments south of the river fought more than 
600 engagements, most of them small affairs 
but all of them wearing down the Japanese. 
"We have been able to detain 50,000 Japa-
nese in this area," claimed General Yeh Ting. 
"No matter how often they change their 
troops, they never dare lessen the number 
which they maintain here." The people in 
Chekiang called the army "the soldiers of 
God" and "world army No. 1." They had a 
saying, "as in lettuce you eat the heart, so 
if you join the army join the Fourth." Other 
Central Government armies held positions 
flanking this territory, but only the New 
Fourth operated all around and in between 
the enemy-held towns. 
With the general worsening of relations 
between Communist and Kuoinintang forces, 
a whole series of armed clashes took place 
between the New Fourth and surrounding 
Chinese armies, beginning in February 1940. 
Endless details of these clashes are available, 
but in the absence of checking, nobody knows 
how accurate the details are. It seems at least 
clear that the New Fourth payroll was seized 
on one occasion, and its normal river-cross-
ing, by which communication with Chung-
king and with troops on both banks was 
maintained, was permanently blocked. The 
New Fourth claims to have intercepted 
secret instructions from Chungking to local 
commanders to suppress all New Fourth 
forces by the end of the year. On the other 
hand, the New Fourth was plainly increasing 
its influence in the nearby armies, many of 
whose troops came over to its ranks during 
the armed clashes. 
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Despite these frictions between Chinese 
forces, the New Fourth continued to fight 
the J apanese. Major Evans F. Carlson, who 
visited the area occupied by the New 
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Fourth in Southern Anhwei last October, re-
ports in the China Defense League news let-
ter one of their victories near Kianghsien. "I 
arrived in this area," he said, "shortly after a 
particularly aggressive Japanese drive had 
been turned back by the New Fourth Army. 
The Japanese came in two columns, one 
from near Wuhu .... They were allowed to 
make a deep penetration and then the mobile 
units of the New Fourth fell upon their flanks 
and rear, forcing them to withdraw with a 
loss which was estimated, both by the New 
Fourth and Central Government officials, at 
an aggregate of 7,000 casualties." Major 
Carlson was also struck by the emphasis on 
the "united front"; even the small children 
talked to him earnestly about the "need for 
all people to work together for National Sal-
vation." He adds, "There were many signs of 
the close cooperation between the army and 
the people." 
Relations between the New Fourth and 
the commander of the War Zone, General 
Ku Chu-tung, were not so excellent. He main-
tained a blockade against the New Fourth 
which it was perilous to try to pass. A brilliant 
young intellectual, Wu Ta-kwan, took a party 
of Chinese journalists to the New Fourth 
region. General Ku asked them not to visit 
the New Fourth, but they replied that since 
they were "comforting" all the armies in this 
region, they would comfort the New Fourth 
too. On their return they were summoned be-
fore General Ku, and their young leader 
went alone. He was never seen afterwards. 
Telegrams sent by Mme. Sun Yat-sen to 
ascertain his fate were met by General Ku's 
bland statement that "he had never heard 
of the man." 
The Order to Move and Disband 
The New Fourth was ordered to leave the 
Yangtze Valley and move north of the Yellow 
River to be amalgamated with the Eighth 
Route. This was given as a "proposal" in 
July and as an "order" on October 19. The 
Generalissimo himself did not sign the order 
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till December 10, and there is excellent reason 
for believing that it was originally issued by 
Ho Ying-chin without Chiang's knowledge, 
and later confirmed in the interests of army 
discipline. The New Fourth regarded the 
order almost as an instruction to commit 
suicide. They pointed out that only one-tenth 
of their army was on government pay-roll, 
and the rest consisted of local peasants who 
could not easily leave their homes. No winter 
uniforms had been furnished, no supplies for 
the long journey, and no munitions had been 
received for eight months. Yet they were re-
quired to cross several heavy Japanese con-
centration and pass by many of the Central 
Government armies which were already 
clashing with them in armed battle and 
which gave no pledge of permitting them to 
pass. They were promised munitions and 
pay after they should reach the Yellow River 
but they had fairly good reason for assuming 
that they were not expected to arrive. 
The Communists' most serious objection 
to the order, however, wa~ that they con-
sidered it not a routine military command 
but a political and rnilitarv splitting of China 
into two parts, in preparation for peace with 
Japan in Central and South Chi.m. None of 
those with whom I talked claimed that this 
was the Generalissimo's intention. Chiang 
Kai-shek himself in an interview with me in-
dignantly denied any intention of making 
peace with Japan or of leaving any part of 
China outside his rule. But it was clear that 
the concentration of all the Communists in 
North China-which had never been under 
allegiance to Chiang anyway-would give 
Japan a heaven-sent excuse for concentrating 
her attacks in that region. If she should 
then choose to make a demonstrative with-
drawal from the Yangtze Valley, the peace 
tendencies in Chungking would be immeasur-
ably strengthened. 
"We do not refuse to obey the military 
order," said the Communists, "but we want 
it made part of a wider political settlement 
which will allow democratic safeguards in 
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all of Free China. We can trust the Chinese 
people to preserve their unity against Japan. 
But if all Communists are put in North China 
and prohibited ebewhere, and no people's 
movements are allowed, we cannot trust the 
Chungking bureaucrats. The result will be 
either civil war or the splitting of China into 
two parts, with neither of which alternatives 
can we agree." 
Throughout December, during my visit in 
Chungking, the capital was buzzing with the 
"threat of civil strife." Scores of Chinese 
leaders were urging "patience" and "unity." 
Reactionaries were gloating: "We have them 
surrounded and can crush them." Meanwhile 
some twenty-seven divisions of Central Gov-
ernment troops, uncontaminated by previous 
contact with the "Reds" were moving east-
ward to surround the New Fourth Army with 
the obvious intent of forcing it out of the 
Yangtze Valley or eliminating it from the 
scene. Minor clashes with local forces con-
tinued through most of December. 
The Ambushing of New Fourth Troops 
First news of the final clash was an-
nounced from Chungking on January 17 by 
the Military Council which stated that Yeh 
Ting had been imprisoned and was awaiting 
court-martial, following suppression of a 
"revolt" by his troops. Yeh Ting was ac-
cused of having plotted "to control the 
China coast from Chekiang and Kiangsu in 
the south to Shantung in the north"-all 
regions, incidentally, held by Japan. General 
Ku Chu-tung, commander of the 3rd War 
Area, was credited with having "successfully 
suppressed the rebels." A few days later, 
Edgar Snow reported from Hongkong that it 
had been the New Fourth Army's rear-guard 
of some 10,000 men which had been sur-
rounded, and that they had fought for eight 
days, losing 4,000 casualties before they were 
suppressed. 
Only a month later did full uncensored 
details arrive from China, signed by Chinese 
of standing who had steadily supported the 
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united front. It seems that Commander Yeh 
Ting finally received in late December part 
of the money needed for moving his army 
north as ordered. Taking this as evidence of 
good faith, he sent his forces over the river, 
the last to leave being a rear-guard of 4,000 
armed men protecting some 6,000 unarmed 
persons, consisting of families of officers, poli-
tical workers, and the hospital with nurses, 
doctors and wounded. 
This force of 10,000, more than half un-
armed, was surrounded by 80,000 Chung-
king troops in a narrow mountain pass near 
Maolin, and were attacked by troops under 
General Shankuan Yun-hsian on January 
6th. They ran out of food on the fourth day, 
and fought without eating until their am-
munition gave out on the eighth day. They 
telegraphed to Chungking begging that the 
attack on them be stopped, and were told 
that General Ku Chu-tung, the war zone 
commander, had already been told to stop it. 
During the sixth day of their fighting, ques-
tions were raised in the National Military 
Commission in Chungking, to which Ho 
Ying-chin replied that "everything is pro-
ceeding satisfactorily," that the New Fourth 
is obediently moving northward, and that a 
"slight difficulty" had arisen which he had 
directed General Ku to solve. On the seventh 
day of the fighting, Mme. Sun Yat-sen and 
others telegraphed an appeal from Hong-
kong. The fighting ended on the eighth day 
when munitions gave out. Of the 10,000 
people, more than 2,000 were killed and 4,000 
wounded or captured; the dead included 
numerous political workers, technicians, 
nurses and children. The remnants of the 
New Fourth were arrested, and their gen-
eral, Yeh Ting, held for court-martial. The 
second in command, Hsiang Ying, was 
wounded and subsequently killed. (General 
Yeh Ting was then taken to the headquar-
ters of General Ku Chu-tung in Shangyao, 
Kiangsi Province, which is noted as the loca-
tion of Ku's torture chamber where many 
patriotic youths have met their death. Since 
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there are no foreign correspondents in Shang-
yao, General · Yeh's transfer there suggests 
that his fate is to be settled without risk of 
unfavorable publicity.) 
On January 17, four days after the con-
clusion of this battle, the Chungking Mili-
tary Council-it is not known whether the 
Generalissimo was included-issued the order 
disbanding the New Fourth. Ten days after 
this, on January 27, the Generalissimo him-
self assumed responsibility for the official 
disbanding but stated that it would not af-
fect other Chinese troops, i.e. the Eighth 
Route. Thereafter, Chungking censorship 
shut down and Chinese representatives in 
this country spread the word that the Com-
munists had accepted the disbanding and 
there would be no more trouble. 
Communist Revolutionary Military Committee 
Issues Official Order 
Belated material from China, how-
ever, makes plain the tremendous tensions of 
the past month. On January 20, three days 
after the official order of January 17, the 
"Revolutionary Military Committee" of the 
Chinese Communist Party-which has not 
been heard of since the earlier civil war-
issued an "Official Order" reorganizing the 
New Fourth under the command of Chen-
Yi, formerly the commander of the New 
Fourth's First Unit. A few days later-in any 
event before January 26, the date on which 
my information was mailed from China-the 
"spokesman of the Revolutionary Military 
Committee" issued his detailed charges, out-
lining the fifteen steps of the alleged plot by 
"pro-Japanese elements" in Chungking to 
take China into the Axis. Such accusations 
have been made for the past year, but never 
in so definite a form. Especially interesting 
is the fact that some of the steps in the al-
leged plot took place while the letter con-
taining the charges was on the ocean. 
The first step was the barrage of propa-
ganda against the Communist armies which 
was going on during my December visit in 
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Chungking. The next steps were the destruc-
tion of the New Fourth forces south of the 
Yangtze and the official disbanding of the 
entire New Fourth Army. These steps were 
taken in January. According to the Commu-
nist spokesman, the future development of 
this plot will involve the following: actions 
by large Chungking armies "tightly coopera-
ting with the Japanese armies" in the regions 
between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers to 
separate the New Fourth from the Eighth 
Route in order to liquidate them separately. 
Following this, pretexts would be sought for 
the official disbanding of the Eighth Route 
Army and the arrest of its commander, Chu 
Teh. Next would come arrests of Commu-
nists all over China, including Chou En-lai, 
official representative of the Eighth Route 
Army in Chungking, who is already under 
surveillance. The Communist daily newspa-
per would be closed and large-scale war 
would be launched to seize Yenan. 
Japan, it is alleged, would next withdraw 
her troops from the Yangtze Valley, and 
throw them into a ruthless war against the 
New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies in 
North China. Fifth column elements in 
Chungking would then celebrate the recovery 
of the lost territories as due to the valor 
of Chungking troops, and would demand a 
"glorious, victorious peace." If it proved im-
possible to call off the war officially, because 
of the Chinese people's objections to the 
Japanese terms, an undeclared truce would 
reign in all parts of China except the North 
where the plotters would obstruct the Com-
munist armies by means ranging from block-
ade to armed attack. All anti-Japanese 
elements would, of course, be persecuted as 
alleged Communists-a tactic familiar from 
the days when the government was at Nan-
king. Thus Chinese public opinion would be 
taught to believe that victory had been won 
everywhere except in those northern regions 
where "the Communists either cannot or will 
not drive out Japan." 
This would make possible the signing of 
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the actual peace pact which would leave 
Japan or Japanese puppets in control of 
North China-insofar as they could clear 
out the Communists-and of China's ports. 
China would then join the Axis. (If this 
transition seems a bit abrupt to American 
readers, it must be remembered that the 
Germans have always been popular in China, 
since they lost their rights of extra-territori-
ality, and that Germany gave significant help 
to the Chinese in the early stages of this 
war. Granted the illusion of a "glorious 
peace of victory," it might not be impossible 
to direct considerable nationalist feeling into 
the channel of "clearing the rest of the im-
perialists out of East Asia and the South 
Seas.") 
Regardless of whether these charges will 
prove correct in every detail, large-scale civil 
war looms behind the fact that they were 
made. Some 800,000 Chungking troops, one-
half the government forces, are now in posi-
tions for attacking the Communists. About 
80,000 are said to have been engaged in the 
disarming of the New Fourth rear-guard 
south of the Yangtze in the battle which 
raged January 6th to 13th. Another 200,000 
to 300,000 have moved into North Anhwei 
and K.iangsu where they separate the Eighth 
Route from the New Fourth; and are already 
reported to be engaged in attempts to defeat 
them. In the northwestern provinces, an 
estimated half million encircle the Yenan 
district and blockade the Eighth Route Army 
in Shansi. 
The Future of the New Fourth Army 
Meanwhile, the reorganized New Fourth 
Army, with 90,000 men north of the Yangtze 
under its new acting commander, Chen Yi, 
is still the pivot on which the future turns. 
It has been ordered by the Communists' 
Military Committee to continue the fight 
against Japan in the name of Chinese na-
tionalism, on the basis of Sun Yat-sen's Three 
People's Principles "while always guarding 
against the sudden attack of the pro-Japa-
nese elements," i.e. attacks which may be 
launched by Ho Ying-chin. If attempts are 
made to disband these New Fourth forces, 
the Communists' Military Committee official-
ly states that the Eighth Route will come to 
its assistance. This will give the Commu-
nists an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 season-
ed fighters, a much smaller and worse-armed 
force than Chungking possesses. But Chung-
king contains elements that will not hold 
together in a war against the Communists, 
especially if the Communists can convince 
the local population and soldiers that they 
are being wantonly attacked. . 
If this struggle really begins, it will not be 
the mere disarming of a few Communists. 
It may well change the map of China and 
East Asia, and the balance of the present 
world war. Chungking exists today as the 
Central Government of China only because 
it is the symbol of unity toward which nine-
tenths of the Chinese people passionately 
aspire. This gives it the prestige which con-
trols recalcitrant provincial warlords who 
might otherwise carve restless kingdoms of 
their own or bargain profitably with Japan. 
Governors of at least two of the sea coast 
provinces are reputed to favor Wang Ching-
wei, but are held to Chungking by the press-
ure of the Chinese people. Yunnan in the far 
South shows repeated tendencies to go off 
on its own. 
If Chungking ceases to be the symbol of 
Chinese unity, warlords all over the country 
may pull loose. 
One pattern which might easily emerge 
would be the old split of China into "Three 
Kingdoms" which has occurred more than 
once before. There would be Nanking, al-
ready recognized by Japan and from which 
Germany and Italy would no longer have a 
reason for refusing recognition; Chungking, 
a mountain republic approached through the 
back door of Burma, and recognized by 
America and Britain unless Ho Ying-chin 
combined it with Nanking; and a north or 
northwest republic, either "united front" or 
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Communist, which would ask for and per-
haps eventually secure recognition from the 
U.S.S.R. It seems likely, however, both from 
the Communist representatives' sta.tements 
to me last December and from the details of 
such events as now get past the Chungking 
censorship, that the Communists will for the 
present try to avoid this three-cornered 
geographical split and will rather seek to 
arouse popular movements and pressures 
throughout China in order to effect a new 
governmental grouping in Chungking. 
Important political figures have already 
separated themselves from the actions of 
Chungking. Mme. Sun Yat-sen led a group 
of Kuomintang members in a joint message 
on Jan. 12th to the Generalissimo and the 
Central Committee of the Kuomintang, ap-
pealing for the resumption of the national 
united front. On the same day, Marshal 
Feng Yu-hsiang, addressing a committee of 
the National Military Commission in Chung-
king, cited Poland and France as glaring 
examples of nations destroyed by internal dis-
sension, and made a plea for national solid-
arity. The aged General Yen Hsi-shan spoke 
even more strongly in an interview tele-
graphed Jan. 11th to Hongkong: "There are 
undesirable elements in the Kuomintang who 
directly threaten our war of resistance and 
indirectly give the Japanese assistance. Not 
only am I dissatisfied with them, but the en-
tire nation dislikes them. . . . They arouse 
the progressive elements to disobedience to 
the Central Government." On about January 
18, General Sheng Shih-tsai, Governor of 
Sinkiang Province, sent a telegram to Chung-
king in which he stated that after the mili-
tary record of the Eighth Route and New 
Fourth armies against Japan, there is no 
ground or excuse for any "punitive cam-
paign" against these armies. He declared 
that if civil war develops in China now, this 
can Ol}ly help the Japanese invaders in their 
plan of conquering China; and that the 
people and armies of Sinkiang stand solidly 
behind a policy of unity, resistance, and 
struggle against all those preparing to sell 
out to Japan under the cover of a so-called 
"punitive campaign." 
These significant and powerful political 
figures have been ruthlessly side-tracked by 
Chungking reactionaries throughout this pre-
sent war. Their appeal-and also the appeal 
from many other sections of China-in-
dicates the widespread ferment going on in 
all provinces of China behind the censor-
ship veil. Armed clashes, reported but as yet 
unverified, in four northern provinces, in-
dicate that the military suppressions pre-
dicted by the Communists' Military Commit-
tee are still going on. In reading news one 
should look for indications whether the Com-
munist forces seem to be withdrawing to 
form a new northern area, or whether the 
agitation still goes on across all of China, 
looking towards a new and more democratic 
central government. If large scale civil war 
is launched against Yenan, we may look to 
see Communist forces break through the cor-
don of government troops which have con-
tinually blockaded them from any contact 
with the U.S.S.R., and which-barring the 
excuse of civil war-they would not dare 
try to force. Then they might really secure 
the arms which, during the whole war thus 
far, they have been denied. 
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It will never be too late to save China. 
She will survive. Her people will organize 
under some banner to cast forth Japan, even 
though it may not be under Chungking. But 
it may soon be too late to prevent a powerful 
Japanese attack on the Southeast Asian 
front, which would inevitably involve yet an-
other area in the Second World War. Only 
swift action to preserve Chungking as the 
center of Chinese unity can do that. The 
quickest way to cut the Gordian knot might 
be an immediate conference among the 
American, British and Soviet Embassies in 
Chungking, a pooling of information and 
charges from both sides of the strife, and 
joint pressure to stop a Chinese civil war. 
Acting together, these three countries might 
prevent a temporary crisis from becoming a 
national and international disaster. 
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